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SUBJECT: UKRAINE: FM TARASYUK ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS,  
SEA BREEZE, TANKOVA

REF: A. KIEV 2281

1B. KIEV 2280

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

¶1. (C) Summary: During Ambassador's June 13 presentation of a copy of his credentials, Foreign Minister Tarasyuk said President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc could not accept Socialist Party of Ukraine leader Moroz as parliamentary speaker, despite Moroz' insistence that this was his condition for joining the "Orange" Coalition that would form the next cabinet. Representatives of the three potential Orange Coalition partners (Our Ukraine bloc, Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko, and the Socialist Party), including Tarasyuk, were meeting June 13 to discuss the impasse. If the negotiations failed, Our Ukraine would announce its readiness to enter into negotiations with the Party of Regions to form a governing coalition. Tarasyuk assured Ambassador that any future coalition would make passage of legislation to authorize international military exercises its top priority; the question was not whether the legislation would pass, but when. Ambassador also raised a problem with acquisition of the Tankova property for the new Embassy Office Building and passed talking points on the UN Human Rights Council (septel). End summary.

¶2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and PolOff, presented a copy of his credentials June 13 to Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk. MFA 2nd Territorial Department Director Anatoliy Ponomarenko and MFA notetaker sat in on the Ukrainian side. During the meeting, Ambassador urged speedy formation of a governing coalition and noted the damage caused by the prolonged uncertainty over the shape of Ukraine's future government. He asked Tarasyuk for an update on coalition negotiations.

Tymoshenko's Duplicity

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¶3. (C) Tarasyuk assured Ambassador that his Our Ukraine bloc was doing everything possible to establish an "Orange" coalition of Our Ukraine bloc (OU), Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko (BYuT), and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU). As a member of OU's working group, he understood that the process of forming a coalition was not easy and, indeed, was more difficult than expected. He accused ex-Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko of colluding with SPU to force SPU leader Oleksandr Moroz into the parliamentary (Rada) Speaker position, which had led to an impasse that threatened to scuttle an Orange coalition possibility.

¶4. (C) As evidence, Tarasyuk said BYuT had recently begun to support positions that it formerly opposed but which SPU favored. Ideologically, he noted, BYuT was closer to OU than SPU, but not BYuT, had opposed OU positions on topics such as eventual Ukrainian membership in NATO, WTO, and the

EU. SPU also opposed measures regarding privatization of agricultural land. Thus, OU representatives had been surprised when Yuliya Tymoshenko backed Moroz' bid to become Rada Speaker. Tarasyuk argued, however, that SPU should not demand the Speaker position since it had come in third among the Orange coalition parties; indeed, OU should have the right to fill the Speaker position since it had come in second. Unfortunately, Tarasyuk commented, SPU's position seems to be locked in concrete. Furthermore, once Moroz began to demand to be Speaker, Tymoshenko had distanced herself from the dispute, saying it was a matter to be settled between Moroz and President Yushchenko.

¶ 15. (C) As further evidence of Tymoshenko's complicity with SPU, Tarasyuk said BYuT recently flip-flopped on recognition for veterans of the Ukrainian nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) (which had fought in World War II on the German side) and now opposed it, which had long been the SPU position. Tarasyuk noted that Tymoshenko used to favor such recognition to garner support from the nationalist electorate that was part of her political base.

#### And Her Lack of Accountability

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¶ 16. (C) Continuing his catalogue of Tymoshenko's double dealing, Tarasyuk said Tymoshenko had categorically rejected procedures that OU proposed to ensure that she would adhere to the coalition agreement on principles and platform. When Yushchenko was prime minister during the Kuchma presidency, Tymoshenko was his first deputy prime minister, and Tarasyuk was previously foreign minister, the government had created interagency government committees to vet draft decisions to be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers. The committees facilitated decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers. When she

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became Prime Minister, Tymoshenko had abolished the committees, granting her more control over the Cabinet of Ministers' work; as a result, Cabinet meetings had lasted 12-14 hours, Tarasyuk claimed, while, under Yekhanurov, they lasted at most 3 hours. Tarasyuk implied Tymoshenko was still grasping for greater control of governmental processes.

#### The Our Ukraine Bloc's Nightmare

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¶ 17. (C) The recent evidence of close cooperation between SPU and BYuT had convinced OU representatives that the combination of Tymoshenko as Prime Minister and Moroz as Speaker would create an insurmountable problem for OU, Tarasyuk concluded. As a result, OU had announced June 10 that it would wait for a change of position on the part of its potential Orange coalition partners. The deadline for doing so had been noon, June 12. Today (June 13), Tarasyuk said, the OU Political Council had met for several hours in the morning and, as a result, decided to call a meeting of the Orange Coalition troika, which had begun at 3:00 p.m. (note: Ambassador's appointment with Tarasyuk was also at 3:00).

#### The "Wide" Coalition

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¶ 18. (C) Tarasyuk said, if the troika meeting failed to resolve the Rada Speaker selection, OU would issue a statement that blamed SPU and BYuT for the failure in negotiations and declare that OU was prepared to create a "wide" coalition. Tarasyuk foresaw no problems in terms of economic issues, but OU would initiate discussions on whether Regions would agree to other OU conditions. Tarasyuk denied that, in such a coalition, Moroz would still have the possibility of becoming Speaker. A fundamental OU position, Tarasyuk averred, would be that Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych could not be prime minister. In forming a coalition with Regions, however, each coalition partner would have the opportunity to select either

a candidate for prime minister or for Rada Speaker. In such a constellation, Tarasyuk claimed Moroz would not be Rada Speaker.

Undercurrents

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¶ 9. (C) Responding to Ambassador's comments regarding USG support for a reform-minded government, Tarasyuk noted that SPU appeared to have hardened its position. When SPU had been part of the government, it had never questioned the Ukraine-NATO annual target plan. SPU was now beginning to oppose legislative approval for the plan. Tarasyuk referred vaguely to undisclosed parties (note: presumably Russia) that were influencing the SPU position.

Other Topics

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¶ 10. (C) On the legislation to authorize international military exercises, Tarasyuk said he was not worried about the legislation as such; the only question was the timing. The legislation would be a priority for whatever coalition that was formed. Natalya Vitrenko's People's Opposition bloc and the Communist Party had been manipulated into mounting demonstrations against the Sea Breeze exercise, and unfortunately Party of Regions deputies had joined in. President Yushchenko had personally chaired a National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) meeting to consider the situation surrounding Sea Breeze, and the Ukrainian government continued to closely monitor the situation. Tarasyuk said he expected some "resolute" decisions (not further specified) to be taken in the next few days.

¶ 11. (U) Ambassador also raised acquisition of the Tankova site for the new Embassy Office Building, informing Tarasyuk and Ponomarenko of the latest obstacle to its purchase, and passed talking points on the UN Human Rights Council (septel). Tarasyuk and Ponomarenko were surprised by the Tankova developments. Ponomarenko promised to follow up.

¶ 12. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:  
[www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev](http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev).  
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